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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
John Muguira appeals following the district court’s order denying his motion for 
credit for time served.  Mr. Muguira acknowledges that the record does not contain a 
certified-as-served copy of the arrest warrant issued for the Canyon County probation 
violation, but asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion requesting 
credit for time served on his Canyon County probation violation.  Mr. Muguira asserts 
that his Canyon County sentence should have been credited because:  (1) he was 
arrested and held in the Ada County Jail for the same charge for which the probation 
violation was filed; thus, the issuance of the Canyon County warrant was due to the Ada 
County crime, and (2) he was constructively served with the Canyon County arrest 
warrant and such was the functional equivalent of a bench warrant. 
   
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In 2009, Mr. Muguira was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, marijuana, with intent to deliver.  (R., pp.57-67.)  The district court imposed 
a sentence of five years, with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed 
Mr. Muguira on probation for five years.  (R., pp.57-67.)   
 A motion for probation violation was filed in April of 2011, alleging Mr. Muguira 
violated his probation by being charged with new crimes—driving without privileges and 
felony DUI, drinking beer which was a violation of a term of his probation, failing to pay 
his fines, fees, and costs, failing to serve his forty days on the Sheriff’s Inmate Labor 
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Detail (“SILD”),1 and failing to provide documentation of completing his community 
service.2  (R., pp.68-88.)  Mr. Muguira was ordered to serve 86 days in jail for not 
completing SILD.  (R., p.104.)  After Mr. Muguira admitted to violating some of the terms 
and conditions of his probation, but before he was sentenced on the violations, the 
State filed another probation violation report which alleged that Mr. Muguira violated the 
terms of his probation by being charged with a new crime and by testing positive for 
methamphetamine and marijuana.  (R., pp.127-128, 130-140.)  The Report of Probation 
Violation was filed in September of 2011, and it also alleged that Mr. Muguira admitted 
to drinking a beer.  (R., pp.132-133, 139.)   
Mr. Muguira admitted to violating some of the terms of his probation and his 
probation was revoked, but the district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Muguira for 
365 days.  (R., pp.148-150, 155-159.)  After his rider, Mr. Muguira was placed back on 
probation for four years.  (R., pp.163-170.) 
A few months later, another probation violation report was filed.  (R., pp.171-
177.)  The report alleged that Mr. Muguira violated the terms of his probation by being 
arrested for felony DUI, by leaving his assigned judicial district without permission 
where he was arrested on June 1, 2012, for DUI and booked in the Ada County Jail, 
and by consuming alcohol.  (R., pp.171-177.)  The Register of Actions indicates a 
Petition for Probation Violation was filed and a warrant was issued for the probation 
                                            
1 Mr. Muguira filed an affidavit in response to the probation violation report in which he 
attested that he had spoken to personnel at the SILD office and requested additional 
time to complete the SILD from the district court.  (R., pp.92-98.) 
2 Mr. Muguira’s affidavit also included documentation of his completion of the requisite 
community service.  (R., pp.94-96.) 
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violation on June 12, 2012.  (R., p.8; see also Idaho Supreme Court Date Repository.)  
The warrant was quashed on October 4, 2013.  (R., p.182.)   
On October 11, 2013, Mr. Muguira appeared on the probation violation, and was 
released to his own recognizance.  (R., p.188.)  On November 4, 2013, Mr. Muguira 
admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation and his probation 
was revoked but reinstated.  (R., pp.191-195.)   
One month later, another probation violation was filed which alleged that 
Mr. Muguira was charged with a new crime—felony eluding.3  (R., pp.196-218.)  
Mr. Muguira admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation and 
the district court revoked his probation and credited him with 369 days.  (R., pp.234-
243.)   
Mr. Muguira then filed a pro se Motion for Credit for Time Served and a 
supporting affidavit.  (R., pp.244-258.)  Mr. Muguira asked for credit for the time he 
spent in custody of the Ada County Jail and in the Idaho Department of Correction 
(“IDOC”) retained jurisdiction program.  (R., pp.246-247.)  Mr. Muguira submitted 
documents in support which showed he was incarcerated in Ada County Jail from 
June 1, 2012, to December 4, 2012, and again from September 24, 2013, to October 4, 
2013.  (R., pp.249-252.)  He also submitted documents showing there was a bench 
warrant issued on June 4, 2012, and showing that he was confined in IDOC facilities 
                                            
3 Mr. Muguira had multiple cases pending during the probationary period of the Canyon 
County controlled substance case.  Herein, Mr. Muguira will refer to this case, Canyon 
County case number 2009-15664, as the “Canyon County probation violation” case.  
Mr. Muguira will refer to Ada County case number 2012-8187 as the “Ada County DUI” 
case.  However, Mr. Muguira was also charged with felony eluding in Canyon County 
case number 2013-27527 and with felony DUI in Ada County case number 2011-4346.  
(R., p.199.) 
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from December 6, 2012, to September 24, 2013.  (R., pp.253-256, 258.)  On May 29, 
2015, the district court denied the motion without a hearing, finding there was no 
evidence that Mr. Muguira was served with the June 12, 2012 warrant for the Canyon 
County probation violation.  (R., pp.259-261.) 
 On July 10, 2015, Mr. Muguira filed a pro se Notice of Appeal from the district 
court’s order.  (R., pp.262-265.)  An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 6, 
2015.  (R., pp.273-276.)    
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for credit for time served? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Muguira’s Motion For Credit For Time 
Served 
 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Muguira asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for 
credit for time served. First, the charges for which Mr. Muguira was serving jail time in 
Ada County formed the basis for his Canyon County probation violation charges and the 
Ada County DUI sentence was to be served concurrently with his Canyon County 
probation violation.  Where the same acts gave rise to both warrants for Mr. Muguira’s 
arrest and concurrent sentences were imposed in the new Ada County DUI case and 
the Canyon County probation violation case, Mr. Muguira was entitled to credit on each 
sentence from the date Mr. Muguira was arrested for the charges resulting in the 
probation violation.  Alternatively, where an arrest warrant had been issued for 
Mr. Muguira on his Canyon County probation violation, the warrant was constructively 
served in that Ada County Jail deputies were aware of the warrant and discussed such 
with Mr. Muguria.  Despite the fact that a signed copy of the warrant was apparently 
never returned to the district court, such constitutes the functional equivalent of a served 
bench warrant.  For the reasons set forth herein, he respectfully requests that this Court 
order that he be given credit for time served in the amount of 490 days.   
    
B.  Standard Of Review 
      A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law 
governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts 
exercise free review.  State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006).  On appeal, 
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the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless 
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record 
and are therefore clearly erroneous.”  Id.  
 
C.  The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Muguira’s Request For Credit For 
Time Served  
 
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion 
to correct the calculation of credit at any time; thus, the time the judgment is entered or 
executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation.  I.C.R. 35(c).  
Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has recently made clear, “the language of I.C. § 
18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this 
case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court give the 
appropriate credit . . . .”  State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014).  “This 
means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as defined 
by the statute.4  Id.   
Idaho Code § 19-2603 mandates that when a defendant has been arrested on a 
bench warrant for a probation violation and the probation is subsequently revoked, “the 
time of the defendant’s sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench 
warrant.”  I.C. § 19-2603;5 see also State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006) 
                                            
4 While the defendant in Moore was seeking credit for prejudgment incarceration, and 
Mr. Muguira is seeking credit for time served pursuant to a probation violation, the 
reasoning of Moore applies equally to all periods of incarceration identified in the credit 
statutes. 
5 At the time the district court denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for credit for time served, the 
statute read thusly.  Since that time I.C. § 19-2603 was amended, effective July 1, 2015, 
and now provides, in relevant part:   
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(holding that a probationer held on an agent’s warrant after being arrested for a new 
offense was entitled to credit for time served from the date of arrest, not the date of 
service of the bench warrant, as the agent’s warrant had the same effect as a bench 
warrant in preventing him from being able to bond out on the new charge); State v. 
Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 922 
P.2d 424-25 (Ct. App. 1996) (granting credit for time served pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603 
for pre-judgment time involuntarily served during a period of withheld judgment after 
service of the “functional equivalent” of a bench warrant).   
Idaho Code § 20-209A addresses credit for time served both before and after 
judgment.  That section provided:  
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his 
term of confinement begins from the day of his sentence. A person who is 
sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for time 
spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that 
detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was 
imposed. The time during which the person is voluntarily absent from the 
penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the board of correction, or 
from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or 
counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced. 
 
I.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added).6  Section 20-209A thus recognizes that credit for any 
time in physical custody may be awarded when the detention is merely “in connection 
with the offense for which the sentence was imposed.”   I.C. § 20-209A.   
                                                                                                                                            
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service 
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to 
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation . . .     
 
I.C. § 19-2603 (2015). 
6 At the time the district court denied Mr. Muguira’s motion for credit for time served, the 
statute read thusly.  Since that time I.C. § 20-209A was amended, effective July 1, 
2015, and now provides:   
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In Mr. Muguira’s case, the Register of Actions indicates that a Warrant of Arrest 
for Probation Violation was issued by the district court on June 12, 2012.  (R., pp.8, 185-
187.)  Although the warrant was never returned, the Warrant of Arrest gives the “Last 
Known Address” of Mr. Muguira as “ADA COUNTY JAIL, BOISE, IDAHO.”  (R., p.186.)  
The Petition for Probation Violation identifies, in Exhibit A, as the rules violated:  (1) that 
Mr. Muguira was arrested for an alleged new felony, Driving Under the Influence; and 
(2) that Mr. Muguira left the Third Judicial District without permission where he was 
arrested and booked in the Ada County Jail.  (R., pp.171-173.)  
Mr. Muguira was incarcerated from June 1, 2012, until October 4, 2013, when he 
was released on probation.  (R., p.246.)  While serving his rider, Mr. Muguira asked the 
district court to quash the warrant, presumably to avoid having the warrant served 
during his period of retained jurisdiction as it was possible that Mr. Muguira would be 
removed from the midst of programming to Canyon County to answer for his probation 
violation charges.  (R., pp.178-181.)  Mr. Muguira asked the district court to quash the 
warrant in a document filed on May 6, 2013, and the warrant was eventually quashed 
almost five months later, on October 4, 2013.  (R., pp.178-184.)  The resultant period of 
incarceration totaled 490 days for which Mr. Muguira requested credit in his Canyon 
County case.     
                                                                                                                                            
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his 
term of confinement begins from the day of his sentence. The time during 
which the person is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility 
under the control of the board of correction, or from the custody of an 
officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or counted as a part of 
the term for which he was sentenced.   
 
I.C. § 20-209A (2015).  
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1. Mr. Muguira’s Probation Violation Allegations Were Based Upon Precisely 
The Same Acts That Gave Rise To His Ada County Charges  
  
Mr. Muguira is entitled to credit for the period of time in which he was 
incarcerated on the Ada County charges, as the Canyon County probation violation 
allegation was filed as a result of the Ada County offenses and subsequent 
incarceration.  See I.C. §§ 19-2603; 20-209A.    
Idaho Code § 19-2603 governs credit for time served from service of a bench 
warrant for a probation violation.  In State v. Bitkoff, 157 Idaho 410, 413 (Ct. App. 2014), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals found that I.C. § 18-309 and its “for the offense” limitation 
did not apply to I.C. § 19-2603.7  However, I.C. § 20-209A also pertains to credit for time 
served post-judgment.  Prior to its amendment effective July 1, 2015, it applied to 
circumstances such as “after appeal” which occurs after a judgment is rendered.  
Further, I.C. § 20-209A did include the “for the offense” language; thus, the two statutes 
should be read in pari materia, giving credit to those incarcerated both for the new 
offense that comprises the sole basis for the probation violation and for the probation 
violation case. 
In State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2008), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
reasoned that credit should be awarded both for a new criminal charge and for the 
probation violation that is alleged due to the new criminal charge: 
If a defendant is entitled to credit on all concurrent sentences for 
prejudgment incarceration simultaneously served in a single county on 
                                            
7 Although the Bitkoff Court held that an arrest warrant sent to a custodial state could 
serve as a detainer, though the defendant would not receive credit pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2603 unless the warrant was served, the Court also recognized the incongruity of such 
a holding, noting, “We recognize the anomaly created by the distinction between the 
warrant merely acting as a ‘hold,’ after which no credit would be due, and actual service 
of the warrant, after which credit would be due.”  Id. at 418 n.2. 
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separate crimes, the same logic requires credit on both of McCarthy’s 
sentences where his incarceration on a probation violation in the 
possession case and on a new criminal charge in the delivery case were 
based upon precisely the same conduct and concurrent sentences are 
imposed. When it is the same acts that give rise to both warrants for the 
defendant’s arrest and the confinement is served simultaneously, it cannot 
be said that the incarceration is uniquely attributable to either case 
individually. 
 
McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 399.  The Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled 
to credit on his probation violation sentence and remanded the case back to the district 
court for entry of an order granting the defendant credit for the time he was in custody 
on the probation violation.  Id. 
Here, the charges for which Mr. Muguira was serving jail time in Ada County 
formed the basis for his Canyon County probation violation charges.  (R., pp.171-177.)  
Mr. Muguira’s Ada County DUI sentence was to be served concurrently with his Canyon 
County probation violation.  (R., pp.238-241; Motion to Augment, pp.6-10.)  Where the 
same acts gave rise to both warrants for Mr. Muguira’s arrest and concurrent sentences 
were imposed in the new Ada County DUI case and the Canyon County probation 
violation case, granting credit on each sentence from the date Mr. Muguira was arrested 
for the charges resulting in the probation violation is appropriate. 
   
2. Alternatively, The Arrest Warrant For The Probation Violation Served As 
The Functional Equivalent Of A Bench Warrant  
 
The Canyon County probation violation which resulted in the issuance of the 
June 12, 2012 arrest warrant alleged Mr. Muguira had violated the terms of his 
probation by being charged with a DUI in Ada County and by being incarcerated in Ada 
County Jail.  Thus, Mr. Muguira was being held on the functional equivalent of a bench 
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warrant—due to his arrest in the Ada County case an arrest warrant had also been 
issued in the Canyon County case.   
Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that credit shall accrue after the service of a 
bench warrant.  However, although I.C. § 19-2603, only provides for credit after a bench 
warrant has been served, Idaho appellate courts have found that the “functional 
equivalent” of a bench warrant will also suffice to begin calculating the amount of credit 
a defendant is entitled to.  See Buys, 129 Idaho at 128; see also Covert, 143 Idaho at 
170-171.   
In State v. Buys, the Idaho Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s motion for 
credit for time served pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603 for pre-judgment time involuntarily 
served during a period of withheld judgment. 129 Idaho at 127-28.  The Court of 
Appeals noted that I.C. § 19-2603 provided that where a defendant has been arrested 
and his probation revoked due to the violation, the defendant’s incarceration from the 
time the bench warrant was served will count as part of the sentence.  Id., 129 Idaho at 
127.  However, the Court concluded that the district court erred in not allowing credit for 
“discretionary time” the defendant served pursuant to an order of incarceration, as the 
defendant’s liberty was affected and there was no term or condition of probation 
allowing for discretionary jail time.  Id.  The Court found that the order, which appeared 
to have been drafted by and issued at the request of the defendant’s probation officer, 
appeared to be the functional equivalent of a bench warrant issued as a consequence 
of an alleged violation of the terms of probation.  Id., 129 Idaho at 128.   Notably, the 
Court found that the order affected the defendant’s liberty, because, even though he 
was also arrested for the new offense, he would have been eligible for release on bond 
 13 
in the new case but for the order requiring his incarceration for a period of time for the 
probation violation allegation.  Id.  The Court therefore concluded that the order for 
incarceration was in substance and effect a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest in 
connection with an alleged probation violation, and he was entitled to credit for time 
served under I.C. § 19-2603.  Id. 
The manner of service of an arrest warrant is addressed in Idaho Criminal Rule 
4(h)(3) as follows: 
The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The officer 
need not have the warrant in possession at the time of the arrest, but the 
officer shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon as possible. A 
telegraphic or other copy of the warrant of arrest may be used by the 
officer at the time of the arrest or for the purpose of showing the warrant to 
the defendant after the defendant's arrest. If the officer does not have the 
warrant in possession at the time of arrest, the officer shall then inform the 
defendant of the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant has been 
issued. 
 
I.C.R. 4(h)(3).  A warrant is returned when, “The officer executing a warrant shall make 
return thereof to the issuing magistrate or any other magistrate before whom the 
defendant is brought pursuant to Rule 5.”  I.C.R. 4(h)(5).   
Here, Mr. Muguira discussed the June 12, 2012 warrant with deputies at the Ada 
County Jail during his incarceration there.  (Motion to Augment, pp.1-3)  For reasons 
unknown, the deputies either did not believe a warrant had been issued (which is belied 
by the entry on the Register of Actions) or did not believe the warrant was active.  
(Motion to Augment, pp.1-3)  Nonetheless, I.C.R. 4(h)(3) does not require the officer to 
physically hand a copy of the warrant to the arrestee, merely to show it to him after 
arrest or to tell him of it at the time of the arrest.  While an officer failed to file a return on 
the warrant in Mr. Muguira’s case, such was not the fault of Mr. Muguira, and does not 
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invalidate service, or constructive service, of the warrant.  As a result, Mr. Muguira’s 
arrest and incarceration on the Ada County DUI was the functional equivalent of service 
of a bench warrant on the Canyon County probation violation. 
Thus, Mr. Muguira asks this Court to find that he was served with the functional 
equivalent of a bench warrant where he had already been arrested and was 
incarcerated, a warrant of arrest was issued in the probation violation case which 
specifically identified the correct location of Mr. Muguira (Ada County Jail), Mr. Muguira 
knew of the existence of the warrant, his attorney knew of the warrant, Mr. Muguira 
informed Ada County Jail personnel/officers of the existence of the warrant, and he 
asked for the warrant to be served on him multiple times.  (R., pp.185-187; Motion to 
Augment, pp.1-3.)  The purpose of a warrant is to inform the defendant that he is 
believed to have violated a law and to inform law enforcement that the defendant should 
be arrested so that he can be brought before the court to answer for the alleged 
violation of the law.  See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), available at Westlaw 
BLACKS (defining “warrant” as “[a] writ directing or authorizing someone to do an act, 
esp. one directing a law enforcer to make an arrest, a search, or a seizure.”); see also 
State v. Ligon-Bruno, 152 Idaho 274, 277 (Ct. App. 201) (“The purpose of a bench 
warrant . . . is to bring the defendant before the court”).  While a warrant gives law 
enforcement authority to bring a suspect into custody, the purpose of a warrant has 
been served if the suspect is already in custody and all persons concerned know there 
is a warrant.  This is true even if a corrections officer has not signed and filed a 
document identifying the date she handed the warrant to the defendant in jail. 
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According to Mr. Muguira’s letter to the district court, he was in custody at the 
Ada County Jail and he repeatedly asked his trial counsel whether there was an active 
warrant issued by Canyon County for a probation violation.8  (Motion to Augment, pp.1-
3.)  Where the record is clear that both the probation officer and the district court know 
the correct location of the defendant (jail), and even the jail deputies were aware that 
there was a warrant issued for the arrest of Mr. Muguira, the warrant had been 
constructively served.  For this Court to find otherwise would work an unjust result by 
which Mr. Muguira would receive substantially less credit in the Canyon County 
probation case, 490 days less.  Ultimately, Mr. Muguira, through no fault of his own, was 
placed in a situation where it was entirely up to the probation officer and/or the law 
enforcement official to whom the task of serving the warrant fell, whether to serve the 
warrant and return it to the district court.  This lack of diligence by law enforcement 
should not result in Mr. Muguira losing 16 months, or 490 days, of credit for time served.   
                                            
8 According to Mr. Muguira, the warrant was not active until the second week of 
December 2012.  (Motion to Augment, pp.1-3.)   
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Muguira respectfully requests that this Court 
order that he be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 490 days. 
 DATED this 9th day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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